My title refers to three accounts of interpersonal love: the rationalist (and ultimately rational egoist) account that Terence Irwin ascribes to Plato; the anti-rationalist but strikingly similar account that Harry Frankfurt endorses in his own voice; and the 'ekstatic' account that I -following the lead of Martha Nussbaum -find in Plato's Phaedrus. My claim is that the ekstatic account points to important features of interpersonal love to which the other accounts fail to do justice, especially reciprocity and a regulative ideal of equality.
Philosophers have long associated the idea of love with the idea of self. Plato's Symposium portrays Socrates enthusiastically espousing Diotima's alleged view that love is a form of seeking immortality for oneself. On her view, men who are 'pregnant only in body' seek out women, with whom they can produce merely mortal offspring or, as Aristotle might say, 'other little themselves'. But men who are 'pregnant in soul', men like Homer and Hesiod, are more fortunate: they can produce truly immortal offspring, poems like the Iliad and Odyssey, which promise their fathers truly immortal glory and remembrance .
2 Virginia Woolf, inspired no doubt by Aristophanes' Lysistrata, does a brilliant send-up of the Symposium in her story 'A Society' (2011). Woolf, writing on the eve of World War II, portrays a group of women who have been unreflectively 'populating' the world while, they assumed, their men were 'civilizing' it. When they begin 'as usual' to praise men, one of their number bursts into tears -no doubt, they all suppose, because she fears that no man would ever wish to marry her. But they soon learn the real reason. The poor girl, whose father left her a fortune on the condition that she read all the books in the London Library, can no longer read: 'half or perhaps only a quarter of the way through' she has discovered that books 'are for the most part unutterably bad'. Her friends, shocked to learn that the Shakespeares, Miltons and Shelleys are exceptions and not the rule, agree at once to suspend their activity of populating the world and they form instead a society to determine whether their reproductive activity is justified by so-called 'civilization'. *Email: jen.whiting@utoronto.ca Apparently these women either fail to care about their own immortality or have no illusions about the power of procreation to secure it. But we need not have waited on Woolf for a rejection of Diotima's view: just in case we are too dim to read the drunken Alcibiades' subsequent speech as Plato's sign that we should be questioning this view, Plato has Socrates himself retract this view in the Phaedrus.
3 Socrates there compares the offspring of writing to the offspring of painting: like paintings, but unlike merely mortal offspring, written works cannot 'talk back' (Phaedrus, 275d -e). Now we might be tempted to view this as yet another advantage of poetic offspring, but Socrates clearly views it as a disadvantage: true immortality requires one to sow the seeds of one's discourse in the soul of a living, breathing and comprehending interlocutor, one who need not depend on its father to defend its ideas, but can defend itself and can eventually sow its own seeds of discourse in other such souls, who can in turn do the same, and so on ad immortalitatem. So if one is in the business of seeking immortality, one might sensibly prefer engaging in dialogue with promising students to writing books and articles, which may prove so unutterably bad that they cease to be read. But the thing about promising students is that they talk back: that is part of what makes them promising as students. 4 And the same I think should be said about promising beloveds. What Socrates seems to emphasize here is the importance of the beloved's independence, the importance of her having a voice -and presumably also a mind -of her own.
But this point tends to get lost in the views of commentators who view Plato's eudaimonism as a form of rational egoism the signs of which are generally to be found, from one dialogue to the next, in whatever Plato has Socrates say. The most prominent such commentator in recent years is arguably Irwin, whose own sympathies with rational egoism are never far from the surface of his interpretations of Plato, Aristotle and others. Consider, for example, the appeal Irwin makes to the Diotiman view that is channeled by Socrates in the Symposium.
According to Irwin, Diotima's conception of erôs as a kind of selfpropagation is what allows Socrates -and so Plato himself -to justify concern for others, including the philosopher's apparently self-sacrificing return to the cave in Republic 7. Irwin likens Diotima's view of the persistence of oneself over time to Derek Parfit's, saying 'the persistence of the same self is more like interpersonal propagation than we might think . . . since it transmits my character and personality to someone (viz., my future self) who is in some ways different from myself ' (1995, 307; my italics] . 5 Irwin then defends interpersonal propagation, on Plato's behalf, by appeal to the undisputed value of intrapersonal propagation:
the person in whom I propagate these [valuable] aspects of myself need not be me in the future; it may be another person who already exists now. I can therefore achieve what I value about intrapersonal propagation if I propagate these aspects of myself in another person; if I value intrapersonal propagation, I ought to value interpersonal propagation . . . Since I cannot always preserve myself, I must seek to propagate the valuable aspects of myself in other people (Irwin, 1995, 306). Interpersonal propagation is thus an activity of what I have elsewhere called 'the colonizing ego' (Whiting, 1991) .
I first coined this phrase in response to Irwin's tendency to read Aristotle's doctrine of the friend as an 'other self' as treating the friend as an 'extension of [one's] own activities' (Irwin, 1988, 614, n6) . As Irwin himself put it in his discussion of Aristotle's view: [Al's] valuing of Al's activities is valuing of those activities as done by Al; and so when they [i.e., such activities] are done by Ann, another Al, Al also values them as Al's (Irwin, 1988, 395) . 6 My original objection was to reading the 'other self' doctrine as requiring this sort of appropriation of the friend and her activities. I proposed an alternative (and in my view more palatable) reading of Aristotle's doctrine, one according to which character-friends value their friends' activities in the same way they value their own in the following sense: just as the virtuous person values her own activities not primarily because they are hers but primarily because they are good, so too the virtuous person values her friend's activities not primarily because they are her own -nor even primarily because they are the friend's own -but primarily because they are good.
7 This allows the virtuous agent to value her friend's activities in the same way that she values her own without requiring her to treat her friend's activities as literally her own. And that seems to me a good thing.
Irwin seems to be responding to something like my objection when, in his account of Platonic erôs as involving self-propagation, he states and then replies to the following objection:
What has this [viz. self-propagation] to do with the interests of the beloved? If B is moulded into the shape in which he best satisfies A's desire for self-propagation, it seems to be A's interests rather than B's that guide the changes A tries to produce in B (1995, 311 ; my italics).
Irwin's reply runs as follows:
. . . Since A is concerned for B as a way of propagating A, and since A cares about A's interests for A's own sake, A will also care about B for B's own sake, not instrumentally to some further end. For insofar as B propagates A, B deserves the sort of concern that A applies to A. Although A certainly does it all for A's sake, doing it for B's sake is doing it for A's sake, if B is A's way of propagating A (1995, 311; my italics) 8 I fear however that this does not answer the objection: the references to A in the talk of A's doing what he does 'as a way of propagating A' and in the talk of B's deserving a certain sort of concern 'insofar as he propagates A' seem to me too central. It would be different if Irwin had spoken instead of A's propagation in B of certain qualities that A happens to regard as good, and as good independently of A's so regarding them: for it is their goodness, and not their relation to A, that is supposed on my account to do the main justificatory work.
My account is more like what we find in the Phaedrus, where the beloved's likeness (or potential likeness) to the lover takes a back seat to the beloved's likeness (or potential likeness) to whatever god the lover happens to worship (Phaedrus 252d -253c). But I prefer -for reasons partly to do with my subsequent discussion of Frankfurt -to speak in terms of ideals rather than gods and to say that the beloved's likeness (or potential likeness) to the lover will take a backseat to the beloved's likeness (or potential likeness) to whatever ideal the lover himself happens to cherish. The god (or ideal) serves as a model for the lover in two ways: first, as a model for himself, one he emulates in his own psychic development; and second, as a model for his beloved, the model according to which he seeks to mould his beloved.
Note, however, that the beloved is chosen in the first place partly because of his own likeness (or potential likeness) to the god (or ideal). The idea is perhaps that the beloved (who is assumed to be younger) is already implicitly and unconsciously emulating the god (or ideal) that the lover himself explicitly and consciously emulates. This to some extent mitigates concerns about objectionable forms of colonization. But the main point is this: insofar as each independently emulates the same god or ideal, the initial similarity between the lover and beloved is incidental. And even where they become more similar to one another as a result of their interaction, their similarity to one another remains largely the result of the way in which each emulates the same god or the same ideal. Matters are of course complicated insofar as each serves as the other's imperfect image of the god or ideal, which may not be empirically accessible to them. So their emulation of the god or ideal must to some extent involve their emulation of each other. But the point remains: the god or ideal, and the lovers' mutual emulation of it, are conceptually and normatively primary; any similarity of the lovers to one another plays at best a subsidiary role. It may even be that the beloved's emulation of the god or ideal is more successful than the lover's emulation of it, in which case the lover's success should be judged according to the beloved's similarity to the god or ideal rather than the beloved's similarity to the lover. We might put this point by saying that insofar as love involves self-propagation, what the lover seeks to propagate is not his actual self, but rather his ideal self.
Irwin appears to acknowledge this point when he speaks of intrapersonal propagation as involving the desire that one's future self preserve or improve upon valuable aspects of one's present self (1995, 308) . And something like this is clearly required in the Symposium, where Socrates (following Diotima) cites the fact that we would cut off our own arms and legs if they were diseased as evidence that the lover desires things not simply qua his, but to some extent qua good (205e). But Diotima then puts an acquisitive, and in that sense colonizing, gloss on this: the lover is supposed to desire that good things become his, and remain his forever (206a). It is this acquisitive gloss that I take Socrates to reject in the Phaedrus, where he emphasizes the independence of the beloved.
But the emphasis on independence is an aspect of Socrates' view that Irwin tends to ignore. For he reads the Phaedrus as simply adding to the Symposium, which he takes to focus exclusively on the erôs of the rational part of soul. 10 Irwin takes the Phaedrus to add to the Symposium in two ways: first by reminding us of the other sorts of erôs belonging to the non-rational parts of soul, forms of erôs ignored in the Symposium but discussed in the Republic; and then by calling our attention to a feature of rational erôs ignored in the Symposium -namely, that rational erôs seems, like non-rational erôs, to involve a kind of madness. But Irwin suggests that the madness here is merely apparent: the subject of rational erôs appears mad from the point of view of someone who restricts the role of the rational part to the sort of merely 'instrumental prudence' involved in calculating how best to satisfy the independently given desires of the non-rational parts. Such a person fails to see that the rational part has its own proper ends and desires, which are unintelligible to the person who thinks that the only function of the rational part is to promote the satisfaction of independently given non-rational desires. So anyone whose rational erôs leads her to pursue the ends of the rational part at the expense of her non-rational desires will seem mad to the instrumentalist. But she is not really mad: it is just that the intensity and passion with which she pursues the ends of her rational part resembles the intensity and passion of those lovers who are genuinely mad in the sense that they sacrifice their true interests to the pursuit of their misguided passion.
I agree that the point of the second speech Socrates gives in the Phaedrus is to reject the sort of calculating or 'prudential' attitude expressed both in Lysias's speech and in Socrates' first speech, where he attempts to out-Lysias Lysias and is so ashamed of what he says that he speaks with his head covered. But I do not agree that Socrates' second speech -the one he delivers in his own voicedescribes the true lover as abandoning only a 'narrow instrumental' form of prudence. For I think we can see, if we read carefully, that Socrates depicts the true lover as abandoning the point of view of prudence full-stop.
[The philosopher, i.e., the true lover,] stands outside human concerns [existamenos de tôn anthropinôn spoudasmatôn ] and draws close to the divinity; ordinary people think he is disturbed and rebuke him for this, unaware that he is possessed by god. Now this takes me to the whole point of my discussion of the fourth kind of madness -that which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of true beauty; then he takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so; and he gazes aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below [tôn katô de amelôn ] -and that is what brings on him the charge that he has gone mad. This is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by god [ pasôn tôn enthousioaseôn ] can take for anyone who has it or is connected with it, and when someone who loves beautiful boys is touched by this madness he is called a lover . . . (249c8 -e4)
In its madness the lover's soul cannot sleep at night or stay put by day; it rushes, yearning, wherever it expects to see the person who has that beauty. When it does see him, it opens the sluicegates of desire and sets free the parts that were blocked before. And now that the moment of pain and goading are stopped, it can catch its breath and once more suck in, for the moment, this sweetest of all pleasure. And it is not at all willing to give up, and no one is more important to it than the beautiful boy. It forgets mother and brothers and friends entirely and doesn't care at all if it loses its wealth through neglect. As for proper and decorous behavior, in which it used to take pride, it despises the whole business. Why it is even willing to sleep like a slave, anywhere, as near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to get! That is because in addition to its reverence for the one who has such beauty, the soul has discovered that the boy is the only doctor for that terrible pain (251e1 -252b2). This is clearly not a description of someone who trades a narrowly instrumental conception of prudence for a broader more enlightened one. Irwin's sanitized account of the lover's alleged madness simply fails to do justice to what Socrates actually says -that the lover's soul 'forgets mother, brothers and friends entirely, and doesn't care at all if it loses it wealth through neglect' and so on. Note also that if Plato had wanted Socrates to say that the true lover is not really mad but only appears so, he clearly had the requisite language ready to hand, language employed liberally throughout the middle books of the Republic and elsewhere. And if Plato had wanted Socrates to say that, he should not have structured Socrates' entire speech around the distinction between two kinds of madness. But Plato has Socrates argue explicitly, with no hint of irony, that not all madness is bad and that some forms of it are good, indeed divine. This is the crux of Socrates' second speech and Irwin's reading renders it otiose.
Irwin's attempt to save Socrates from his apparent misalliance seems to me a case of misplaced charity. It makes perfectly good sense to call what Socrates is talking about a form of madness, and this sense is crucial to Socrates' project. He is talking about a form of madness associated, partly thanks to the Phaedrus, with ekstasis: a form of madness that takes the subject out of his ordinary condition -i.e., ek his ordinary stasis -or (as Socrates puts it) out of himself. It is this taking of the subject out of himself that makes it appropriate to speak of the subject as mad. But if the condition to which he is transported is a good one, then it is appropriate to speak of his madness as good.
The maniacal aspect of Socrates' view is lost if we follow Irwin in reading Socrates' second speech as abandoning a narrow, instrumental form of prudence in favor of a broad, non-instrumental one: 'non-instrumental' because the beloved's good is not simply an instrumental means to promoting the lover's independently specifiable good but is rather a component of the lover's good; and 'broad' because the lover's good is supposed to include the good of the beloved. 11 We can make better sense of Socrates' description of the lover as mad if we read him as saying that the true lover abandons the point of view of prudence (or self-interest) altogether. The point is that the lover ceases to consider things from the point of view of his own interest, including the broad sort of interest that Irwin takes to include (non-instrumentally) the interests of the lover's family and other friends.
To see the plausibility of supposing that Plato has Socrates espouse this view in the Phaedrus, we need only compare the passage quoted with passages from the Apology and Gorgias where Plato also depicts Socrates as neglecting his own interests broadly enough construed to include the interests of his friends and family. The Gorgias explicitly assimilates Socrates' devotion to philosophy to his devotion to a beloved (481d -482c), and has Callicles suggest that Socrates' devotion to philosophy leads him to neglect his own interests conventionallybut not necessarily narrowly instrumentally -construed (484c -486c). And when, in the Apology, Socrates imagines someone asking him whether he is not ashamed to have pursued his philosophical mission to the point where he is in danger of being put to death, Socrates says that he would 'rightly' reply as follows:
You are wrong, sir, if you think that a man who is any good at all should take into account [dein . . . hupologizesthai ] the risk of life or death; he should look to this only in his actions, whether what he does is right or wrong, whether his acting as a good or a bad man.
12 According to your view, all the heroes who died at Troy were inferior people, especially the son of Thetis who was so contemptuous of danger compared with disgrace. When he was eager to kill Hector, his goddess mother warned him, as I believe, in some such words as these: 'My child, if you avenge the death of your comrade, Patroclus, and you kill Hector, you will die yourself, for your death is to follow immediately after Hector's.' Hearing this, he despised death and danger and was more afraid to live a coward who did not avenge his friends. 'Let me die at once' he said, 'when once I have given the wrongdoer his deserts, rather than remain here, a laughingstock by the curved ships, a burden on the earth.' Do you think he gave thought to death and danger? (Apology 28b -d).
Socrates continues:
This is the truth of the matter, men of Athens: whenever a man has taken a position that be believes best, or has been placed by his commander, there he must remain without a thought for death or anything else [mêden hupologizomenon mête thanaton mête allo mêden ] rather than disgrace. (28d).
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In all of these texts, Plato seems to associate the best sort of love or commitment to an ideal with the neglect of one's own interests even broadly construed. We lose this association if we make the beloved an extension of the lover or simply count her interests as among the lover's own. For on these models, the lover should still be weighing the beloved's part of his interest broadly construed against other parts of his interest broadly construed. But this is precisely what Socrates says the lover does not do. When the good of his beloved or ideal is at stake, he does not hupologizesthai: he does not engage in any sort of weighing of interests.
14 When what are admittedly his own interests broadly construed conflict with the interests of someone or something he loves, he does not hupologizesthai his other interests, not even very important ones involving mother, brothers, friends. It is in this that the lover's madness consists: that he neglects even things that are admittedly important to him because of his monomaniacal focus on his beloved. And though such monomaniacal focus is often a bad thing, it can sometimes be good, as (for example) in cases where it leads someone to sacrifice his life defending his beloved.
Whether or not such monomaniacal commitment is a good thing may depend on the value of the beloved. This is clearest in the case where the beloved is a cause or ideal. Sacrificing one's life defending the cause of racial justice is one thing; sacrificing one's life defending some pernicious or trivial cause is another.
Cases where one is mono-maniacally committed not to an ideal but to a person are more delicate. But even here, it seems possible to distinguish good from bad forms of commitment. The fact that it is a person for whom I sacrifice myself does not make the sacrifice good or even noble. And we need not imagine cases where I sacrifice myself for a Hitler to make this point. If I am madly devoted to someone who is simply toying with my affection or taking crude advantage of me, my sacrificing myself for him is neither good nor noble; it is pathetic. This hints at some points about reciprocity and equality to which I shall return.
I want at this point to turn to Harry Frankfurt's account of love, which is in some ways similar to the ekstatic account I see in the Phaedrus but seems in the end to share some of the problematic features of Irwin's self-propagation view. Frankfurt's view is similar to the ekstatic view insofar as he takes love to consist primarily in a disinterested concern for the well-being of the beloved, by which Frankfurt means a concern 'motivated by no interests other than those of the beloved , herself . ' (2004, 82) . But because of the role played in Frankfurt's account by the lover's identification with the beloved, he ends up grounding the lover's promotion of the beloved's interests in the lover's pursuit of selfpreservation. And this seems to me problematic.
To see how the problems arise, we need to keep in mind three crucial -and related -aspects of Frankfurt's overall view. The first, which sets him apart from Irwin, is his anti-rationalist and fundamentally subjectivist account of caring.
15 Frankfurt (2004) claims that, as with other forms of caring, the disinterested concern that constitutes love need not be grounded in 'any awareness of the inherent value of its object'. Though Frankfurt allows that love does sometimes 'arise' from the appreciation of inherently valuable qualities, he claims that 'the truly essential relationship between love and the value of the beloved goes in the opposite direction . . . what we love necessarily acquires value for us because we love it . . . the value that [the lover] sees [the beloved] to possess is a value that derives from and depends upon his love ' (2004, 38 -39; my italics) .
This leads to the second crucial aspect of Frankfurt's view -namely, the foundational role played by caring in the constitution of a person's will and indeed in the constitution of what he calls her 'self'. As Frankfurt puts it, 'caring is indispensably foundational as an activity that connects and binds us to ourselves. It is through caring that we provide ourselves with volitional continuity, and in that way constitute and participate in our own agency ' (2004, 17) .
The third crucial aspect lies in the way Frankfurt takes self-love as the 'purest form of love' in the sense that it conforms more closely than other forms of love to what he sees as the four 'conceptually necessary' features of love, and then goes on to claim that the love of parents for their small children is the form of love that comes closest, both in purity and other respects, to self-love. Frankfurt says that love for a person, 'like love of any variety' has 'four main conceptually necessary features' First, it consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the well-being or flourishing of the person who is loved. It is not driven by any ulterior purpose but seeks the good of the beloved as something that is desired for its own sake.
Second, love is unlike other modes of disinterested concern for people -such as charity -in that it is ineluctably personal. The lover cannot coherently consider some other individual to be an adequate substitute for his beloved, regardless of how similar that individual may be to the one he loves. The person who is loved is loved for himself or for herself as such, and not as a type.
Third, the lover identifies with his beloved: that is, he takes the interests of his beloved as his own. Consequently, he benefits or suffers depending upon whether those interests are or are not adequately served. Frankfurt then argues that 'given these defining features, it is apparent that selflove -notwithstanding its questionable reputation -is in a certain way the purest of all modes of love' (80). He starts with the third feature, on which I propose to focus.
Frankfurt says that in the case of self-love, 'the identification of the lover with his beloved is distinctively robust and uncurtailed. For someone who loves himself, needless to say, his own interests and those of his beloved are identical' (2004, 81; my italics). Then, after explaining how self-love most fully exemplifies the other features as well, Frankfurt argues that the love of parents for their small children is the closest of all the forms of love to self-love. Like Irwin's Plato, Frankfurt has no trouble seeing how a person can be immediately moved by her own interests. But he worries about whether a person can be immediately moved by the interests of others, except perhaps her own offspring: the further the object is from the self, the more difficult it becomes for Frankfurt to see how the lover can be directly moved by the beloved's interests simply as such. This is where his talk of identification comes in, even in explaining a parental love.
The close similarity between these two sorts of love is probably due to the extraordinary degree to which the lover, in cases of each of these two sorts, identifies naturally and more or less irresistibly with the beloved . . . . After all, the child originates within the bodies of its parents; and parents normally continue even long after a child's birth to experience it as being still, in some less organic way, a part of them. The intimacy and vividness of this connection tends to diminish as the child separates from its parents and goes its own way. Until then, however, and often afterwards as well, the scope and strength of parental identification are exceptional (2004, 82 -83; my italics). In sum, Frankfurt treats children as first literally and then later what we might call metaphorically 'parts' of their parents -at least until the children start to 'go their own ways', at which point Frankfurt seems to think the scope and strength of the parents' identification with their children, which is the third of the four conceptually necessary features of love, begins to wane. I want to focus on this third feature. For it is not entirely clear to me how Frankfurt understands his talk of identification. Nor is it clear to me that his preferred understanding avoids the sort of problems I see in the self-propagation view. So let's take a closer look at Frankfurt's statement of this feature, paying special attention to the relations among the three elements identified therein. I have for ease of reference indicated the alleged relations in italics and identified the elements by means of lower-case letters in square brackets.
Third, [a] the lover identifies with his beloved: that is, [b] he takes the interests of his beloved as his own. Consequently [c] he benefits or suffers depending on whether those interests are or are not adequately served.
The natural way to take the 'that is' by which Frankfurt connects [a] and [b] is as deflationary -to read [b] 's talk of the lover's taking the interests of the beloved as his own as spelling out what Frankfurt means when he says that the lover identifies with the beloved. Read this way, the talk of identification seems to be talk of a psychological state or attitude the occurrence of which makes it the case -hence the 'consequently' before [c] -that benefits and harms to the beloved are benefits and harms to the lover. And this fits Frankfurt's fundamental subjectivism: if the lover did not so identify, benefits and harms to the beloved would not in fact count as benefits or harms to the lover.
But some of Frankfurt's central claims seem to undermine this 'deflationary' reading. To see how, let us turn to a passage shortly thereafter where Frankfurt considers and replies to a possible objection to one consequence of his fundamentally subjectivist view: namely, the consequence that 'it is axiomatic that a person's self-love is simply, at its core, a disinterested concern for whatever it is the person loves ' (2004, 85; my italics) . The objection, as Frankfurt puts it, runs as follows:
To say that [the person] loves himself too, since it means only that he is indeed devoted to the things he loves, does not appear to add anything to the statement that he loves those things. Thus self-love seems to collapse into nothing more than a love of things one loves (2004, 86 ; my italics).
Frankfurt then replies, in his own voice, that this objection is 'too quick'. And he gives two reasons for saying this. The first concerns the possibility that 'a person who loves nothing , else . can nonetheless show that he loves himself by attempting to overcome whatever personal characteristics may impair his capacity to love and by making suitable efforts to find things that he will in fact come to love ' (2004, 89; my italics) . The second reason -on which I propose to focus -is that someone can fail to love herself because her will is divided.
Because Frankfurt takes volitional unity to constitute the sort of self of which he speaks, he takes failure of volitional unity to entail a kind of failure of selflove. When circumstances require the lover to choose between two (or more) beloveds and to benefit one at the expense of the other, the lover, to the extent that she identifies with each of the relevant beloveds, must in some sense struggle against herself. How exactly Frankfurt should describe this struggle is complicated: either the subject struggles against 'parts' of herself or one 'part' of herself struggles against another. 16 But either way, Frankfurt thinks that if the conflict is not resolved by a decision that places the subject 'whole-heartedly' behind one or the other beloved -if the subject's will remains divided -the subject ends up loving these beloveds without loving herself.
17 For according to Frankfurt, 'to be wholehearted is to love oneself. The two are the same ' (2004, 95 ; my italics).
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I shall say more about whole-heartedness as we proceed, but I want to turn at this point to Frankfurt's 'Necessity, Volition, and Love', where I see further evidence of the work that Frankfurt takes identification to do. Here, as elsewhere, Frankfurt explicitly connects his claim that the lover identifies with her beloved with the fact that 'the claims of love, unlike the mere pressures of emotion and desire, possess not simply power but authority' ([1994] 1999, 138) . This reinforces my suspicion that Frankfurt takes the lover's identification with the beloved to go beyond simply counting the interests of the beloved among her own.
The idea seems to be that the identification helps to explain the special way in which love moves us: it does not simply push us about, as mere emotions and desires do; love instead commands us in something like the way that duty commands us. And the commands of love, like those of duty, are unconditional. Here, however, the subjectivist aspects of Frankfurt's view threaten to create problems for him. For the subjectivity and radical contingency of my love seem to undermine the authority my love has for me. If I could just as well have loved someone or something else instead, then why should I obey the commands of love, especially when they require me to sacrifice other things about which I also care? Why not find a more convenient object of love, one that better fits my other desires and interests? 19 Part of the answer is no doubt that my attitude would not in that case be love: to love someone is to be moved primarily by concern for him, even when this requires me to sacrifice other things about which I care, perhaps even very much. But this is only part of the answer, since it leaves open the question why, if that's what love is, I should allow myself to love at all: why not restrict myself to less demanding forms of caring? Perhaps a few hobbies; not of course anything so engrossing that I am likely to have difficulty abandoning it should it prove too costly, but hobbies that can easily be exchanged for others should circumstances cease to favor them.
But suppose that I do love: I find myself with concern for another that is 'disinterested' in the sense that it is 'motivated by no interests other than' hers. I reflect in a cool hour that this sort of caring is risky, far more risky than a passion for stamp-collecting or swimming and I seek to cure myself of it. But I find that I cannot do so. It is here that Frankfurt thinks we can profitably invoke my identification with my beloved: it helps to explain my inability. Once I do love someone, my love then helps to define me: it is then partly constitutive of my will. If I cannot act in ways contrary to it, that is because I would then be acting against my self; I would be threatening my very identity. That, according to Frankfurt, is why my love has for me the kind of authority it does.
It is important that Frankfurt speaks here in terms of love's authority, as distinct from its power. Pace Martha and the Vandellas, my love is not like a heatwave; it is not something that simply overwhelms me as an obsessive craving might. To say that it has authority for me is to say that it provides me with categorical (even if contingent) reasons to act in accordance with it. I think that it is primarily in order to explain such authority that Frankfurt wants to say that I identify with my beloved. For this allows him to account for the authority my love has for me in terms of a primitive desire for self-preservation. See, for example, the following passage from 'Autonomy, Necessity, and Love':
There is, I believe, a quite primitive human need to establish and maintain volitional unity. Any threat to this unity -that is, any threat to the cohesion of the self -tends to alarm a person and to mobilize him for an attempt at 'self-preservation'.
It seems to me that the authority that love has for us is closely related to this primitive and irreducible need to protect the unity of the self. Since the commands of love derive from the essential nature of a person's will, a person who voluntarily disobeys those commands is thereby acting voluntarily against the requirements of his own will ([1994] 1999, 139; my italics).
But this threatens to yield a distorted account of the kind of authority my love has for me. If I truly love and cannot bring myself to drop my beloved no matter how 'inconvenient' she has become, what holds me back is not primarily concern with my own psychic unity: it is rather my concern for her.
The clearest sign that something has gone wrong in Frankfurt's account is the footnote about Agamemnon's tragic fate that Frankfurt appends to the paragraph from which I have just quoted.
Agamemnon at Aulis is destroyed by an inescapable conflict between two equally defining elements of his own nature: his love for his daughter and his love for the army he commands. His ideals for himself include both being a devoted father and being devoted to the welfare of his men. When he is forced to sacrifice one of these, he is thereby forced to betray himself. Rarely, if ever do tragedies of this sort have sequels. Since the volitional nature of the tragic hero has been irreparably ruptured, there is a sense in which the person he had been no longer exists. Hence, there can be no continuation of his story. This is very odd: I had always thought that Agamemnon's story was continued in the punishment that Clytemnestra eventually meted out to him for his crime. But if Frankfurt is right, then Clytemnestra's actions were wildly misguided. For the 'devoted' father who sacrificed his daughter sacrificed himself along with Iphigeneia.
But it seems to me misguided to ground the authority that the father takes his love to have -as distinct from its power over him -in his primitive need to preserve his own psychic integrity. It may be true that he experiences harms to his daughter as harms to himself; and that in cases where he sees himself as the cause of harm to her (whether intentional or not), he experiences what he does as a form of self-harming. But this does not mean that his reluctance to harm her is motivated by a primitive need to preserve his own psychic integrity. The point of speaking of authority here, and not simply of power, is presumably to introduce reference to the agent's conscious motives -i.e., to the kinds of considerations that agent himself takes to provide warrant or justification for his action. And to the extent that the father really loves his daughter, his motive should not be to preserve his own psychic integrity, but rather to avoid the harm to her, simply as such. And this can be his motive even if an important effect of believing that he is causing her harm is the feeling that he harming himself. For such feelings can be powerful effects of such action without being any part of one's motive for avoiding such action.
I am not entirely sure to what extent Frankfurt would disagree with me, partly because I am not entirely sure what he means when he speaks of grounding the authority of love in a basic need. He uses this sort of language where he says that . . . It is our basic need for self-respect, which is very closely related to our need for psychic unity, that grounds the authority for us of the commands of love ([1994] 1999, 139).
Here Frankfurt appends the following footnote.
Ambivalence as such entails a mode of self-betrayal. It consists in a vacillation or opposition within the self which guarantees that one volitional element will be opposed by another, so that the person cannot avoid acting against himself. Thus, ambivalence is an enemy of self-respect.
Frankfurt does not actually say here that the avoidance of ambivalence functions as a motive, and he may be thinking that it typically functions beneath the level of consciousness in something like the way in which the avoidance of logical inconsistency often functions beneath the level of consciousness. But Frankfurt often seems to have deliberate avoidance of ambivalence in mind, and to connect this with the authority that our desires or motives have for us. See, for example, what he says in 'Identification and Wholeheartedness' ([1987] 1988, 175): It might be said, then, that a function of decision is to integrate the person both dynamically and statically . . . In both respects, the intent is at least partly to resolve conflict or to avoid it. This is not achieved by eliminating one or more of the conflicting elements so that those remaining are harmonious, but by endorsing or identifying with certain elements which are then authoritative for the self.
There are questions here both about what grounds the endorsement or identification, and about the nature of the grounding involved. And here again Frankfurt's subjectivism is an issue.
It seems to me useful here to compare cases in which beliefs about the independent value of an end (such as racial or economic justice) lead me to endorse or identify with a certain motive, with cases in which mere likes lead me to endorse or identify with a certain motive. One might reasonably think that motives I endorse because of my beliefs about the independent value of their objects have a kind of authority for me that motives endorsed on the basis of my mere likes do not. But this would make the kind and degree of authority a motive has for me depend more on the kinds and strengths of the reasons (if any) for which I endorse it than on the mere fact of my endorsement. And it is not clear that Frankfurt would be willing to allow this. For he seems to think it is primarily the fact of my endorsement or identification, rather than what grounds it, that yields authority. So he may see no objection to my deciding to commit myself wholeheartedly to X, whose independent value I may or may not recognize, rather than Y, whose independent value (once again) I may or may not recognize, largely in order to remove ambivalence and so to achieve wholeheartedness.
Still, there may be cases where my recognition of the independent values of X and Y is such that I cannot bring myself to endorse one rather than the other, and could not in fact respect myself if I did. Suppose that X is racial justice and Y is my family, and I know that the risk of working seriously for racial justice is that I may be assassinated and so not there to help my partner raise our children. It seems to me that that deep ambivalence is required if I am to preserve my self-respect: I should be ambivalent about abandoning my family, even in order to pursue racial justice, in a way I should not be ambivalent about abandoning stamp-collectingor even swimming -in order to do so; and my self-respect should suffer if my desire for psychic unity plays a significant role -whether conscious or not -in my decision to abandon either my family or my pursuit of racial justice. So self-respect is less closely tied to psychic unity than Frankfurt claims. And it is not the primitive need for self-respect that grounds the authority our loves and ideals have for us, but rather the other way round: it is because of the authority my loves and ideals have for me that I lose my self-respect when I act against them. So the loss of self-respect presupposes, and does not explain, their authority. Self-respect is far more closely tied to acting for the sake of people or ends whose independent value I recognize than to psychic unity as such.
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Of course valuing persons or ends whose interests may conflict with one another can lead to one's having, at times, to act against the interests of one or the other. But if circumstances are such that one cannot but act against one or the other of his values, any consequent loss of self-respect is due primarily to the fact that he acts against something he values and not to the fact that he has sacrificed some aspect of himself. However psychically torn Agamemnon may have felt between love for his daughter and love for his army, what he sacrificed was not himself, or his psychic unity, but his daughter. His failure was primarily a failure of love, a sign that his love for Iphigeneia was not as strong as his love (as Frankfurt puts it) for his army or (as one might prefer to put it) for his own military power and glory. I do not mean to deny that Agamemnon might have experienced his decision as a form of self-betrayal. Nor do I mean to deny that he might have felt as if he had destroyed himself. But the important question here concerns the most plausible explanation of such feelings. And to the extent that he did feel these things, the most plausible explanation seems to me to be the authority his love had for him. Any sense he had of having betrayed or destroyed himself seems to me to be a consequence of that authority and not part of its explanation.
Frankfurt will no doubt object that matters are not so simple, since on his account the authority that a person's loves and ideals have for her is a function of her endorsement of them, which makes her loves and ideals constitutive of her will and so in some sense of her identity. This is why she experiences acting against them as a form of self-betrayal. But this also means that the grounds of her self-respect are not as independent of the relevant authority as my account suggests: they are no more grounds for self-respect because they have authority for her than they have authority for her because they are grounds of self-respect. For on Frankfurt's account, the grounds of self-respect are constituted simultaneously with, and in precisely the same way as, the relevant authority. We could say that they are two aspects of the same thing -i.e., two aspects of the identity constituted by the agent's endorsements. To say that something has authority for her just is to say that it is a ground of self-respect, and vice-versa. And to say either that something has authority for her or that it is a ground of selfrespect just is to say that she identifies with it.
But this brings us back to the question about why, if at all, we need to tie the authority that our loves and ideals have for us to our identities, except perhaps to explain our tendency to experience benefits and harms to our beloveds as benefits and harms to ourselves. This, incidentally, is how I am inclined to read the 'consequently' in Frankfurt's statement of the third feature: as introducing a psychological effect of the sort of identification to which he refers in [a] and [b] . Because the lover identifies with the beloved -which, as we have seen, seems to involve more than simply counting her interests among his own -he experiences himself as benefitting or suffering depending on whether or not those interests are adequately served. But, again, why the talk of identification? Why not say simply that, because he loves another, he takes pleasure in benefits to her and pain in harms to her? Is Frankfurt's laundering of other-directed motivation though the currency of self-preservation really necessary?
One might at this point suggest that there are cases where the talk of identification seems called for, cases that involve what appears to be extreme selfsacrifice -for example, the case of someone like Martin Luther King Jr., who was prepared to die serving the ideal of racial justice. The suggestion is that at least in cases of such extreme devotion, we are required to say that the agent identifies with his beloved or ideal. Such cases are of course rare; but they may provide evidence that people do sometimes identify with their loves and ideals in ways such that these loves and ideals become partly constitutive of their very selves.
One problem with this suggestion is that it may tempt us towards describing what appear to be forms of self-sacrifice as forms of self-preservation. It may tempt us, for example, to describe Martin Luther King Junior's willingness to run the risk of death by assassination as grounded in a desire for self-preservation rather than as a matter of his caring less about self-preservation than about the cause of racial justice. It might even lead us to treat his death not as the sacrifice of many of his true interests -such as his interests in raising his children and preaching the word of God -but rather as the form of self-actualization.
The temptation here rests partly on a failure to distinguish the sort of positive projects in which we might take a person's self-actualization to consist from the sort of negative projects that someone undertakes only when and because such positive projects are threatened. Aristotle warns against this sort of mistake when he seeks to distinguish military and political activities from activities like contemplation (Nicomachean Ethics X.7). It is largely because activities like contemplation are valuable simply for their own sakes in a way in which military and political activities are not, that we think it noble for a person to sacrifice activities like contemplation for the sort of military and political activities that are often required in order to protect activities like contemplation: one typically sacrifices one's own participation in the activities that themselves make life worth living in order that others may participate in such activities. So fighting racial injustice is what Aristotle would call a 'mixed action' (Nicomachean Ethics III.1). It is not the sort of activity that one wants, without qualification, to spend one's life engaged in; but it is the sort of activity that a person with any moral sense might reasonably choose to spend his life pursuing in a racist world. Such a person thus sacrifices his own pursuit of the sort of activities that are worth pursuing simply for themselves -his own pursuit of philosophy or music or sport -in order that others might some day be able to pursue such things simply for themselves instead of having to toil for racial justice. This helps to explain why we should be reluctant to adopt any view that tempts us to re-describe the sort of sacrifice borne by a Martin Luther King, Jr. as a form of self-realization.
One way to resist this temptation is to note a problem with the proposal that apparent cases of extreme self-sacrifice are best explained by assuming that the agent identifies with his beloved or ideal. The problem is similar to the one Thomas Nagel exposed in the common argument that all motivation has desire at its source. Nagel's (1970) diagnosis of the latter problem runs as follows:
The claim that a desire underlies every act is true only if desires are taken to include motivated as well as unmotivated desires [i.e., desires that are arrived at by decision and deliberation as well as those that simply "assail" us in the way that appetites do], and it is true only in the sense that whatever may be the motivation for someone's intentional pursuit of a goal, it becomes in virtue of his pursuit ipso facto appropriate to ascribe to him the desire for that goal. But if the desire is a motivated one, the explanation of it will be the same as the explanation of his pursuit, and it is by no means obvious that a desire must enter into this further explanation . . . Therefore it may be admitted as trivial that, for example, considerations about my future welfare or about the interest of others cannot motivate me without a desire to act being present at the time of action. That I have the appropriate desire simply follows from the fact that these considerations motivate me . . . But nothing follows about the role of the desire as a condition contributing to the motivational efficacy of these considerations. It is a necessary condition for their efficacy to be sure, but only a logically necessary condition. It is not necessary either as a contributing influence or as a causal condition.
In fact, if the desire is itself motivated, it and the corresponding motivation will presumably be possible for the same reasons . . . The fact that the presence of a desire is a logically necessary condition (because it is a logical consequence) of a reason's motivating, does not entail that it is a necessary condition of the presence of the reason; and if it is motivated by that reason it cannot be among the reason's conditions (1970, 29 -30; my italics) . 22 Nagel's argument turns partly on the way in which motivated desires differ from desires that 'simply assail us': motivated desires can fail to be 'felt' or otherwise empirically accessible in the way in which unmotivated desires tend to be. They are, as John McDowell says, 'consequentially ascribed'. 23 And the same can be said about the sort of identities of which Frankfurt speaks. We might thus recast Nagel's argument, so as to serve against the present proposal, as follows:
The claim that the agent's identity underlies every act of what appears to be extreme self-sacrifice is true only if it includes motivated as well as unmotivated identities, 24 and it is true only in the sense that whatever may be the motivation of the apparent sacrifice, it becomes in virtue of his sacrifice ipso facto appropriate to ascribe to him that identity. But if the identity is a motivated one, the explanation of it will be the same as the explanation of his love or ideal, and it is by no means obvious that an identity must enter into this further explanation.
Therefore it may be admitted as trivial that, for example, considerations about my beloved's welfare or about the promotion of my ideal cannot motivate me to act in apparently self-sacrificial ways in the absence of the appropriate identity. That I have the appropriate identity simply follows from the fact that these considerations motivate me to act against my other interests . . . But nothing follows about the role of the identity as a condition contributing to the motivational efficacy of these considerations. It is a necessary condition for their efficacy to be sure, but only a logically necessary condition. It is not necessary either as a contributing influence or as a causal condition.
In fact, if the identity is itself motivated, it and the corresponding motivation will presumably be possible for the same reasons . . .
If we substitute Frankfurt's talk of authority for Nagel's talk of a reason's motivating, then we can recast my point as follows. Frankfurt's identities are 'consequentially ascribed' in the sense that it is appropriate to ascribe them to agents simply in virtue of the fact that agents are motivated in certain ways -that is, in virtue of the facts about what has authority for an agent. But the explanation of such an identity will be the same as the explanation of these things having authority for an agent: for it is the fact that the agent endorses these motives that makes them both authoritative for her and constitutive of her identity.
What does the work here is largely whatever it is that leads the agent to endorse the relevant motives, rather than some others, in the first place. It is here that I (and I think Plato) take the lover's recognition of the independent value of the beloved (or of her ideal) to be crucial. If the lover is moved by her recognition of that value to endorse her love (or her ideal) in the first place, then why can she be not moved directly by her recognition of that value simply to act on behalf of her beloved (or her ideal)? Is it really necessary to appeal to her identity to explain action on behalf of her beloved (or on behalf of her ideal)?
As Frankfurt himself wants to say in his discussion of his first condition, love is essentially a form of attachment to its object -a form of attachment that disposes its subject to care about the well-being of the object simply as such, and so to be directly moved by the needs and interests of the object simply as such. If I love someone, nothing further is required to explain my acting in her interests. To the extent that further considerations are (sometimes) required to move me, my love for her is less than it might be (which is not to say that it does not count as love at all). This does not mean that I must not consider other factors, such as what morality and perhaps even prudence requires; but these other factors will tend to function as something like side-constraints on my immediate motives.
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So why court paradox in the way Frankfurt does when he identifies whole-hearted love of another with self-love (2004, 95; quoted above)?
In sum, my claim is parallel to Nagel's. He claims in effect that it is only because Humeans already accept the belief-desire model of explanation that they think it necessary (and legitimate) to posit desires in cases where there is no independent evidence of them. I claim that it is only because Frankfurt already accepts an egoistic model of motivation that he thinks it necessary (and legitimate) to posit the relevant identities when there is no independent evidence of them. His idea seems to be that it is largely the fact that I view another, or my relationship to another, as part of my identity that helps to explain what might otherwise appear to be unintelligible forms of self-sacrifice on her behalf. But if our identities 'track' our loves and cares, and so are consequentially ascribed in something like the way Nagel has suggested that motivated desires are, then it seems that we have no ground for ascribing such 'other-involving' identities except that doing so helps us to explain apparently selfless behavior. And this leaves us with the following question: why not simply allow that subjects are moved directly by their appreciation of the loved one's ends and interests?
That lovers are so moved, and that it is characteristic of the best sort of love to be so moved, seems to me the point of Socrates' second speech in the Phaedrus. That's why he connects love not, as Diotima had urged him, with selfpreservation or (as Irwin puts it) with self-propagation, but rather with ekstasisi.e., with the lover's being taken outside of himself. This happens when the lover is so struck by and so appreciative of the beloved that he forgets himself, and the preservation of himself, and allows himself to be moved directly by the interests of his beloved. We can say, if we like, that his very identity is altered, that he becomes a different person. But his in-love identity is a consequence of his appreciation of the beloved and not what explains it. So this identity plays no significant explanatory (or justificatory) role.
The idea here is that an important component of love -perhaps even its primary criterion -is the extent to which the lover is willing to be displaced from his ordinary condition by his appreciation of the independent and autonomous values of the beloved. 26 Consider, for example, the case of someone who will go to great lengths to protect and advance the welfare of his spouse, but would not do so if her goals and interests did not dovetail -and continue to dovetail -so conveniently with those he had prior to and relatively independently of his association with her. The 'prior to and independently of' is crucial here. As long as her goals and interests continue to fit those he had prior to and independently of his relation to her, there is no problem: he takes an interest in her interests and sincerely and genuinely regards them as his own. But if her goals and interests begin to change in ways such that taking an interest in her interests as she comes to conceive of them requires too great a departure from his prior and relatively independent interests -too great an ekstasis or departure from his ordinary condition -he finds himself unable to sustain his love for her. Perhaps he still enjoys accompanying her to the sort of musical events at which they met and which she still enjoys attending. But she has now acquired a passion for rugby; in fact, this is now her dominant passion. And he just can't bring himself to suspend his conception of sport as a trivial activity -or his horror at all those women shoving each other about -far enough to attend even her championship matches.
27 Most of us, I think, regard this sort of failure to be moved outside of one's own prior and independent interests by the independent and autonomous interests of one's beloved as a kind of deficiency of love. 28 The fact we do so suggests an important connection between ekstasis and interpersonal love, a connection emphasized in Phaedrus.
29 And this connection is in tension with the idea of love as a form of self-preservation or self-propagation (where this is a matter of the beloved being moulded in lover's imeage).
In cases where love is deep, the displacement tends to be more or less permanent, so that the lover is permanently altered by her relationship with the beloved. In cases where the displacement is extreme, we may even be tempted to speak of the lover as having become, through her love, a 'new person'. This appears from the point of view of the Symposium to involve a kind of 'role reversal', the beloved's to some extent being propagated, as Irwin might say, in the lover. Such 'role-reversal' is highlighted in the Phaedrus. We see it in the play between Socrates, the elder party, not leading but being led by the young Phaedrus out of his usual city haunts into the country, and out of his usual practice of question and answer into the sort of speech-giving that Phaedrus was keen to practice. And we see it at the end, where the elder Lysias is treated as the beloved of the younger Phaedrus, who is now supposed to teach him a thing or two. The multiplicity of the role-reversals points towards an ideal of reciprocity, an ideal in which each party is both -and equally -lover and beloved.
This, I want to suggest, is the mechanism behind Stendhal's profound claim that 'love does not seek but creates equals'. 30 This claim is profound in the multiple and related ways in which it is true. It is difficult, I think, to count as love a relationship in which the parties do not see one another -or at least aspire to see one another -as equals. And that may be because seeing another -or aspiring to see her -as one's equal is part of what it is to love her. But there may be cases in which it is difficult for two parties to see one another as equals -for example, cases of love between a parent and a young child or between a mentor and her protégé. Still, it may be that the parties' love for one another is itself part of what helps them to see one another as equals (or at least potential equals), and that this seeing is in turn part of what enables their relationship to develop in ways such that they literally become more equal. This should work both ways: the relationship between Al and Ann should bring Al up to Ann's level in some spheres, while bringing Ann up to Al's level in others, which is not to say this is the aim of the relationship for either. The point is that there may be a complicated causal-cum-constitutive relationship between loving someone and seeing her as an equal: loving someone may consist in part in seeing her as an equal (or at least a potential equal), which may in turn play a causal-cum-constitutive role in her becoming and being an equal.
For example, a mentor's practice of treating her protégé's ideas with the sort of respect with which she treats the ideas of her distinguished colleagues may contribute causally to the protégé's development in various ways: her criticisms may help him to develop his views in substantive ways and to learn how better to criticize his work for himself, and her practice of taking his ideas (along with his criticisms of her own work) seriously may give him the sort of confidence in the value of himself and what he is doing to sustain him in times of intellectual selfdoubt. Except in cases where one of the parties is irreversibly debilitatedthrough, for example, illness or age -relationships lacking this sort of equalizing dynamic seem to me to be lacking a central component of interpersonal love. It also seems to me that the equalizing dynamic must be reciprocal: someone who sees himself as so far above his so-called beloved that he expects himself to do all the raising, and her to do all the rising, may be a benefactor; but he is not a lover. And even as benefactor, he is likely to err in the 'colonizing' direction, substituting his judgment about her good for the cultivation of her own autonomous judgment.
There is a wonderful example of the requisite equalizing dynamic in Christine Lahti's (2001) film, My First Mister, about a most unlikely relationship of love. Jennifer, who calls herself 'J', is a prodigiously pierced and tattooed goth/punk 17 year-old who writes eulogies for herself, hangs around cemeteries, and is as alienated from her peers as she is from her parents and teachers. Randall is a staid and self-contained 49 year-old divorcé who lives alone and reads magazines when he is not managing an upscale and conservative men's-clothing store. J sees the help-wanted sign in his window and is fascinated by the fuddy-duddy guy arranging the window, whom she thinks 'kind of cute' in spite of his odd proportions. She approaches him in a humorous way that manages to capture his interest in spite of the mutual antagonism that characterizes their first exchange and sets the tone for the rest of the movie. He tells her to come back in a week looking more like a person and he will consider it. She is no sooner working for him than she proposes to call him 'R', to which he promptly consents (an early sign of the equalizing dynamic at work in their relationship). The rest of the movie depicts her attempt to get him to loosen up and his attempt to get her to straighten out. Each is a natural foil to the other, having emotional strengths and weaknesses that challenge and complement the other's in ways that render them virtual equals in spite of their age-gap; he takes the lead in some areas, she takes it in others. And in spite of the emotional barriers that each has constructed around him or herself, each is gradually moved by the other out of his or her ordinary condition in ways that allow each to grow from the relationship.
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Each of course has his or her limits: Randall initially agrees to J's suggestion that he get a tattoo, but after requesting the smallest possible tattoo -he asks whether they can do a period -he ends up running from the parlor before he is permanently marked in that way. But he is marked in far more significant ways by their relationship. The cumulative effects of the changes they undergo are sufficiently radical that neither would have consented to them in advance, and each puts up significant resistance at various stages. But there is a clear sense in which each allows him or herself to be changed by the other; each is in some sense receptive to these changes. And each ends up both -and equally -lover and beloved. 32 Notes 1. I dedicate this essay to the memory of two friends with whom I often discussed these issues: Rogers Albritton, who died during the year I was drafting this for an APA Symposium, and Paul Hoffman, at whose memorial conference I later presented a revised version. (Paul was himself a student and friend of Rogers and presented a paper at the memorial conference for Rogers.) Though we often disagreed about these issues, I like to think that each would see something of their own spirit living on in this paper. Each was a model of 'ekstatic' conversation, always engaging on equal and reciprocal terms with their interlocutors and willing to follow their interlocutors on the interlocutor's own terms. Paul once told me he thought he learned more from thinking about what his students were trying to say in their papers than from any other activity. He, like Rogers, had a talent for taking others seriously. 2. I refer to passages from Plato by their Stephanus page coordinates, standard in most modern editions, and rely on the translations in Cooper and Hutchinson (1997) . 3. I am much indebted here to Martha Nussbaum's readings of the Symposium (1979) and Phaedrus (1982 Phaedrus ( ), both reprinted in her (1989 . 4. This is partly, no doubt, for what might be called 'self-interested' reasons: Socrates values dialogue because he thinks that challenges from those with different views allow him to test -and so, he hopes, improve -his own views. But dialogue is a twoway street: one's interlocutors are similarly assisted in testing -and so improving -their own views. And Socrates expects his interlocutors to test and make up their own minds. He urges them to care for their own souls, which is something they must do for themselves. But he sees dialogue as a way of helping them do that. In this sense he seems to see philosophical dialogue as an act of love. But Socrates' mission will fail if others simply confirm his own biases. Nor will Aristotelian character-friendship work without disagreement. For more on these points, see Whiting (2005) . Talking back was clearly important to Albritton, though he left few if any traces on paper to which I can refer -only traces in the souls of his interlocutors, like Hoffman, who certainly talked back to him: see Hoffman (1995) . But Rogers also valued his own ability to 'talk back'. When, towards the end of his struggles with emphysema, we were discussing the conditions in which he would be willing to go on living, he said he would not want to be on a ventilator -not even if he was mentally alert and his friends could come talk philosophy to him all day long: he needed to be able to 'talk back'. 5. Note however that where Parfit is generally concerned with the numerical distinctness (or non-identity) of my present and future self, Irwin's talk of my future self as 'in some ways different from myself' suggests that Irwin has in mind something like qualitative difference, not non-identity in the strict numerical sense. So Irwin is relying on the intuitively acceptable idea that we propagate our character traits and values in our own future selves to support the less obviously acceptable idea that we propagate our character traits and values in other selves. For more on Parfit's view, and especially on the way in which he takes it in a very different -and far more impersonal and less identity-involving -direction than the one suggested by Irwin, see Whiting (2002) . 6. For more on Aristotle's doctrine of the friend -or at least the 'character friend' -as an 'other self', see sections 8 -11 of Whiting (2006) . 7. See Magna Moralia 1212b15-20, where the author (certainly an Aristotelian if not Aristotle himself) says that 'the good man loves himself only, if at all, because he is good.' For more on this, see Whiting (1996) . 8. I say that Irwin 'seems to be responding to something like my objection ' because his (1995) contains no reference to my (1991), where I explicitly raise, against the reading of Aristotle presented in his (1988), a version of this objection. His (1995) does however cite my (1986), but he cites it as if the view presented there were a version of the sort of rational egoism that he sees not only in Aristotle but also in the Symposium account of erôs (Irwin, 1995, 307) . This citation is disconcerting given that my (1991) aimed explicitly to correct David Brink's (1991) assimilation of the view in my (1986) to the sort of rational egoism that Brink, following Irwin, attributes to Aristotle. Perhaps however Irwin takes the view expressed in 'Friends and Future Selves' to have been propagated by him in ways such that his interpretation of the view expressed there is more authoritative than my own attempt to correct Brink's rational egoist reading of it. 9. See section 11 of Whiting (1991) , where I suggest that the role played by similarity may be largely epistemological: the similarity of another's values to my own -or at least their not being too distant from my own -may be a condition of my being able to recognize and appreciate the instantiation of these values in the other. But similarity as such need not play any independent justificatory role. 10. See Irwin (1995) 304, which suggests that the Phaedrus clarifies the connections he sees between the Republic and the Symposium; and 306, where Irwin says:
In the Phaedrus Plato combines his different claims about eros in the Republic and the Symposium. He insists that, as the Symposium claims, one sort of eros belongs to the rational part. But he also argues that this eros shares some of the intensity and apparent irrationality of non-rational appetites; that is why 'eros' is the right name for it. If we take a narrowly instrumental attitude to practical reason, even rational eros seems irrational, but Plato rejects this narrowly instrumental attitude. The three dialogues develop different aspects of Plato's theory, starting from different elements in the ordinary conception of eros.
11. For criticism of the idea of taking the beloved and her good as part of the lover's own, on the ground that this involves what I call the 'colonizing ego', see Whiting (1991) . 12. I am using the Grube translation, from Cooper and Hutchinson (1997) , but I have changed his punctuation a bit. Grube thinks Socrates' reply to the hypothetical objector stops here, whereas I think it continues through the rhetorical question about giving thought to death and danger, and that it is only in the lines that follow that Socrates resumes to the jury: 'This is the truth of the matter, men of Athens . . . '. 13. For excellent discussion of this and the Crito passage mentioned in my next note, see Chapter 2 (especially 2.1 and 2.5) of Vasiliou (2008) . 14. See Plato's Crito 48b, where the same point is made, using again 'hupologizesthai'. This verb rarely used by Plato, so I think it striking that among the few places he uses it are Phaedrus 231b4, where it is pointed out in Lysias's speech that non-lovers, unlike lovers whose desire has ended, hupologizesthai (presumably in their balance sheets) past troubles taken on the beloved's behalf; and Gorgias 480c8, where the point is that someone who has done injustice should for the sake of his own welfare submit to punishment and not hupologizesthai any pain involved therein. The verb is not actually used in the passage about forgetting mother and brothers etc., but I think it pretty clear that idea there is that the lover fails, as a result of his monomania, to hupologizesthai any of these things. These all seem to me examples of what John McDowell (1979) calls the 'silencing' of reasons that would, in other circumstances, get a hearing and rightly so. 15. Frankfurt's subjectivism is especially clear in his (2002) reply to Susan Wolf (2002) . 16. I cannot do justice here to the complexities of Frankfurt's view, which involves not mere likes and dislikes but a reflective endorsement of some of these rather than others, and so in the end involves the structure of the subject's will. But I think my points stand independently of how exactly the various interpretive questions raised in the extensive literature on Frankfurt's work are best resolved. 17. One might ask what is so bad, given the alternatives, about this. If circumstances require one to sacrifice one of three people including oneself, is it supposed to be obvious that one should not sacrifice oneself? And if one does self-consciously sacrifice oneself, how exactly can Frankfurt explain this? Surely not by appeal to a basic desire for self-preservation. Of course some degree of self-love may be required in order for there to be any self of the relevant sort in the first place: but once that threshold is reached, it is not clear that self-love should always prevail. For more on these issues, see sections VIII -IX of Whiting (1986) . 18. It is worth pausing here to note that in taking the purest form of love to require whole-heartedness, Frankfurt is demanding something like the sort of monomania associated with erôs by the Phaedrus-Socrates. It seems that wholehearted love cannot, as Socrates puts it, hupologizesthai: love that sacrifices the interests of one beloved to the interests of another does not satisfy as fully as self-love does 'the criteria that identify what loving is'. But this seems to render whole-hearted love of anyone -oneself included -problematic. For unless lovers form a 'joint subject' with a unified good, lovers are always at risk of having to choose -sometimes in non-trivial ways -between their own good and that of their beloveds: this is the price -a price arguably worth paying -of maintaining the independence of the lover and beloved. For an excellent discussion of the 'joint subject' view, see Helm (2010) .
19. I put the point this way partly to bring out the way in which treating one's beloved and her interests simply as one among other parts of the lover's own interests is already problematic in a way that the Phaedrus account -with its appeal to monomania -brings out. 20. For further discussion of Frankfurt's conception of wholeheartedness, see Helm (1996) . 21. For further discussion of the potential value of ambivalence, see Moran (2007) , especially 473 -475. 22. Nagel (1970, 29 -30 concerned with her well-being. For the kind of appreciation in question requires me to see my beloved as an equal (or potential equal) and to be moved largely by her conception of her well-being: i.e., a kind of appreciation that requires me to see my beloved as a subject at least potentially on a par with myself (on which more below). 26. Paul Hoffman's enthusiasm for and commitment to learning about the independent projects of his daughters provide wonderful examples here. Eva Hoffman recounts him staying up all night trying to find organizational charts for the federal agency for which she works -a virtually impossible task in which she says (and I take her word for it) he succeeded (as I have no doubt he did given how much it mattered to him to understand just what she was doing at Head Start and where that fit into the larger picture). And at my last lunch with Paul, shortly before he died, he explained to me all about the exciting field of sustainable architecture in which his daughter Elaine was about to start graduate school. There was also genuine reciprocity here: Elaine explained at his memorial how she had been reading all of the pieces in his recently published Essays on Descartes: she went on to explain, in ways that of course moved me, that Aristotle was his favorite philosopher and that according to Aristotle those of us fortunate to have known Paul would, as a result of our interactions with him, have taken his form into our souls and could now continue to carry it about with us in our daily lives. In sum, the sort of opening of oneself to being affected by another that is shown both in Paul's responses to his daughters and in their responses to him are at least as important to genuine love as the sort of propagation of oneself in another of which Irwin speaks: it is the sort of openness that I think David Velleman has in mind when he emphasizes (as he did in his comments on this paper) the importance to love of vulnerability to the other. See also Velleman (1999) . 27. There is a wonderful scene of ekstasis in the film 'Bend it Like Beckham', when Jules' mother has finally come to accept her daughter's passion for soccer and Jules' father is using the condiments at dinner to teach her the rules of soccer so that she can appreciate watching her daughter's big game: 'the offside rule is when the French mustard has to be between the teriyaki sauce and the sea salt'. At the end of the film Jules is surprised -and thrilled -when, as she is leaving to take up an athletic scholarship in the US, her mother gives her not perfume but a football shirt.
A parallel example from the life of Rogers Albritton, one of the least athletic people I have ever known, was when he took an interest in the game of squash on account of my interest in it, and asked me to explain it all to him in great detail before taking him (as he asked me to do) to watch a professional tournament. His ability to grasp something so alien to his own experience was remarkable, and due at least as much to the intense interest he routinely took in the interests of his friends as to his extraordinary intelligence. 28. Although I spoke in earlier drafts of a failure of love, I now speak of a deficiency of love, so as to make it clear that I do not mean to suggest that there is no love here at all: that depends on the extent to which the deficiencies of any so-called love are systematic or merely local. (For this way of putting the point, I am indebted to Helm (2011, 174) . The point is that, whatever Frank Sinatra sang he wanted, love need not be all or nothing at all: love admits degrees or (as I prefer to say) degrees of perfection. 29. Consider, to take a case more like the one we find in the Phaedrus, a case where a political or academic mentor will go to great lengths to promote the general -and not simply the political or academic -welfare of a promising protégée, but would not do so or continue to do so if he did not believe that the protégée would further a political or academic agenda he had prior to and independently of her association with him. Once again, the 'prior to and independently' is crucial. But it need not imply that the mentor's motivation is 'narrowly instrumental'. The mentor may come, as a result of his association with the protégée, to view her good as part of his own in ways such that his conception of his good cannot then be specified without reference to her and her good. But if what makes it possible for her and her good to acquire this status or to maintain it is the way in which she is disposed to care about and pursue the things about which he cares independently of his relationship to her, or the extent to which she is amenable to being 'moulded', as Irwin puts it, 'into the shape in which [she] best satisfies his desire for self-propagation', then the mentor's concern is on Frankfurt's account 'interested'. The mentor's treating the protégée's good as part of his own does not solve the problem, if that part of the mentor's good does not 'track' the protégée's autonomous development (to which he may of course contribute in important ways). 30. I had originally hoped to write a paper on this claim and the interpretation of it that I sketch in the present paragraph, where I hint at the interplay between the constitutive features of love and the causal roles played by those features in creating a kind of equality between lover and beloved. But this is a difficult topic and much work remains to be done here, especially on the relevant notion of equality, as became clear in the very helpful discussion of this point at the Canadian Philosophical Association meeting in June 2013. All I can say for now is that the relevant notion is fundamentally psychological but -being interpersonal -not without effects in social and political spheres. I hope to say more in future work on this subject. 31. Here again Velleman's points about the importance of vulnerability apply. I would not myself make vulnerability as such as central as he does; I am rather inclined to speak more in terms of the sort of openness to being changed by the other for which some degree of vulnerability is no doubt requisite. 32. The version of this paper presented at the Canadian Philosophical Association meetings was much improved by discussions with earlier audiences whose members (especially my formal commentators) I want to thank for their help. I also want to thank Divya Subramanian for helping to correct an error. 
